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Abstract
On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-
governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior
to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The pre-
sent paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argu-
ment, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these find-
ings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma
form: the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players
are given the possibility of choosing between two different representa-
tions of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to
play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly
higher in the games that were chosen.
Keywords: Freedom of Choice, Self-governance, Social Dilemmas, Framing
JEL-Classification: H41, C90, C91
* This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions received during presentations at the Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany, the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cogni-
tion, Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany, the 2002 ESA Meetings in Stras-
bourg, France, the Strategic Interaction Group of the Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Sys-
tems and at the 10
th International Social Dilemma Conference in Marstrand, Sweden. In particular the authors
would like to thank Martin Beckenkamp, Christoph Engel, Urs Fischbacher, Ben Greiner, Eva Jonas, Stefan
Magen and Elinor Ostrom. Finally we would like to thank Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Reinhard Selten for
letting us use the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Bonn. Financial support from the
European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238) is gratefully acknow-
ledged.
† Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloom-
ington, USA; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany. Web:
http://www.microeconomics.de, E-mail: maier-rigaud@microeconomics.de.
‡ Department of Economics, Public University of Navarre, Spain. E-mail: josej.apesteguia@unavarra.es.2
1. Introduction
In many strategic situations players have the possibility of designing the institutional structure
under which they will act. Self-governance at the local, national, and international level are good
examples of actors actively choosing the games they will play. Collective action and self-
governance has often been found to be superior to the external imposition of rules (Ostrom 1990,
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). A prominent argument that supports this finding was sug-
gested already by Hayek (1945); the immediately concerned may have better information on the
strategic properties of the situation and hence may be better equipped to design a working set of
institutional arrangements.
In this paper we propose a different line of argument suggesting that the very possibility of
choosing the game may in itself have an important intrinsic behavioral effect on outcomes. This
is in line with the economic literature on freedom of choice. According to Sen (1988, p. 290),
“one reason why freedom [of choice] may be important is that ‘choosing’ may itself be an im-
portant functioning ... if all alternatives except the chosen one were to become unavailable, the
chosen alternatives will not, of course, change, but the extent of freedom would be diminished,
and if the freedom to choose is of intrinsic importance, then there would be a corresponding re-
duction of the person’s advantage”.
1 In our context, this is to say that aside from the particulars
of a game, it matters whether an external actor imposes the game on the players, or if the play-
ers are able to choose the game from a set of games. Whereas the literature on freedom of choice
is concerned with an effect of choice on utility, we are interested in a potential behavioral impact
of choice. The question whether this choice has an effect on behavior is of particular importance
to social dilemma situations, because a positive effect could lead to higher cooperation rates ce-
teris paribus. A choice of game effect therefore could potentially mitigate the social dilemma.
We experimentally analyze the effect of choosing the game in the simplest most general di-
lemma form: the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). We run five different treatments, divided into two
categories:t h eassignment treatments and the choice treatments. In the three assignment treat-
ments participants play an externally imposed version of a PD game. The three versions of the
PD game are different representations of the same game. Therefore, they have the same Nash
equilibrium and the same equilibrium payoffs. In the two choice treatments, participants can
choose the version of the PD game they want to play from a set of two possibilities.
We are analyzing the behavioral importance of freedom of choice in a scenario where the differ-
ences between the alternatives available are kept to a minimum. We conjecture that a behavioral
effect when players are given the possibility of choosing between two games that in standard
game theoretic terms are equivalent, and differ only in the presentation of the game, will be even
more pronounced if differences between games are more substantial.
1 See also Bossert et al. (1994), Puppe (1996), and Pattanaik, and Xu (2000).3
The experimental results clearly indicate that the mere fact that participants can choose the game
they want to play has a statistically significant impact on behavior. Cooperation rates are higher
when players can choose the game they want to play as compared to when players are externally
assigned to a game they have to play. As a result, we argue that – given the current laboratory
practice of assigning participants to experimental games - some experimental findings in social
dilemma research may be too pessimistic.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the three ver-
sions of the prisoner’s dilemma game that are used in this paper, Section 3 contains the experi-
mental procedure, Section 4 reports the experimental results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. The Games
2.1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at the RAND CORPORATION devised the prisoner’s di-
lemma in 1950 to illustrate that a non-zero sum game could have an equilibrium outcome that is
unique, but fails to be Pareto optimal. Later, at a seminar at Stanford University, Albert W.
Tucker told the prisoner’s dilemma story to go with the game. Since then the prisoner’s dilemma
has become the most widely studied and used game in the social sciences (see, e.g., Straffin
1993, p. 73 or Poundstone 1992).
Table 1 presents a typical 2 player matrix game in normal form. This game is a PD if and only if,
the following conditions are met: d c b a > > > and c d a b 2 2 > + > .




Note: The first element of the payoff vectors refer to the row player.
In the experiment a=400, b=300, c=100 and d=0
It is well known that both players playing defection is the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Applying the logic of backward induction, Luce and Raiffa
(1957) showed that the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in the finitely repeated prisoner’s di-
lemma game under perfect information is again the one in which both players defect in every
single period. In fact, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is both players defecting in all
periods (see, e.g., Binmore 1992).4
The experimental analysis of the prisoner’s dilemma involves over hundred experiments mainly
in Psychology, Economics, Biology and Political Science.
2 It has been shown that behavior is
sensitive to subtle changes in the experimental conditions. Factors like repetition, experience,
information, relative payoffs, monetary incentives, fixed or random opponents and framing, play
an important role in the experimental behavior.
3
In this paper we will analyze a prisoner’s dilemma game repeated over 20 periods with a fixed
opponent under perfect information. Earlier studies related to our experimental setting are
Dresher and Flood (reported in Flood 1958), Lave (1962), Morehous (1967), Rapoport and Dale
(1967), Dolbear et al. (1969), Roth and Murnigham (1978), Selten and Stoecker (1986), and An-
dreoni and Miller (1993). Basically, the experimental results show that average cooperation lev-
els start relatively high, between 40%-60%, and then gradually decline through time. We will see
that our experimental results conform to this general pattern.
2.2. The Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Evans and Crumbaugh (1966a, 1966b), and Pruitt (1967) independently devised the decomposed
prisoner’s dilemma game. Consider the game depicted in table 2. The game is played as follows:
Both players face the same matrix. Each player must choose between actions Cooperate or De-
fect.
4 Each choice provides a payoff to the player in the self column, and a payoff to the other
player in the other column. Hence, if for example player 1 chooses C and player 2 chooses D,
then player 1 gets w + z, while player 2 gets y + x.
The game in table 2 is a decomposed form of the PD game introduced earlier (Table 1) if and
only if the following conditions hold: y x a + = , x w b + = , z y c + = and z w d + = . Substitut-
ing these into the conditions that define the PD game, the following conditions must be satisfied
for the DPD game:
w y >
z x >
z y x w + > +
2 A search of the Social Science Index resulted in 183 papers containing the word “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and
“Experiment”.
3 For an overview of the theoretical literature see e.g, Binmore (1992) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Good overviews of the experimental literature are found in Lave (1965), Rapoport and Chammah (1966),
Roth and Murnigham (1978), Roth (1988), and Kagel and Roth (1995).
4 In all the experimental games we used labels A and B, instead.5
These inequalities impose constraints on the PD, namely that d a c b + = + . As a result only cer-
tain PDs are decomposable.
5




Since the initial research by Evans and Crumbaugh (1966a, 1966b), Crumbaugh and Evans
(1967), and Pruitt (1967) there have been a series of studies, mainly conducted in the 1970ies,
that analyzed different decompositions of the PD game. In particular, the studies by Pruitt (1970,
1981), Guyer, Fox, and Hamburger (1973), Tognoli (1975), Pincus and Bixenstine (1977), and
Komorita (1987) analyzed the effects of different decompositions on cooperation rates in pris-
oner’s dilemma games.
6 With the exception of Pincus and Bixenstine (1977), who did not repli-
cate the earlier findings by Pruitt, these studies largely revealed that framing has a significant
impact on cooperation rates. While some decompositions elicited less cooperation than the nor-
mal form game, others showed a substantial increase in cooperative behavior. The generally ac-
cepted hypothesis for this finding is that different decompositions arouse different motives in the
players. Based on the type of decomposition, decomposed games are either referred to as take-
some or give-some games, where take-some games evoke lower and give-some games higher
levels of cooperation than the normal form game.
7 Typically, in a give-some decomposition pay-
offs in the “self” column are lower than payoffs in the “other” column, and vice versa for the
take-some decomposition. According to the psychological literature, give-some games evoke a
higher level of cooperation because they provide an opportunity to signal a willingness to coop-
erate at some cost to self, and thus elicit trust and mutual cooperation. Take-some games in con-
trast are supposed to heighten the competitive motivation of the players due to their punishment
aspect inflicted on the other player in case of defection.
Given the findings in the psychological literature on the difference between give-some and take-
some games, it seems natural to evaluate the behavioral consequences of a choice of game in
both settings. The two decompositions of the standard prisoner’s dilemma game presented in
table 1 that will be analyzed experimentally are shown in tables 3 and 4. Note that both decom-
positions add up to the same parent game presented in table 1.
5 Not all PDs are decomposable but a decomposable PD can be decomposed into an infinite number of DPDs.
The conditions for decomposing a PD game are also referred to as seperability conditions. See Hamburger
(1969) for a theoretical treatment of the issue.
6 Decomposed PD games are also discussed in Selten (1978) and Selten (1998).
7 Recently this terminology has also been used in the public good literature where take-some and give-some
refers to whether the public good game is framed as an extraction or contribution game. See for example An-
dreoni (1995), or Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1998) who explicitly refer to decomposed PD games.6








Table 3 shows a give-some decomposition of the normal form game, and table 4 a take-some
decomposition.
3. Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of
Bonn using a program based on the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher (1999). At the
beginning of each session participants were randomly assigned to one of the 18 computer termi-
nals. Before the session started, participants first had to read the instructions (see Appendix A),
and then had to answer test questions to check if they understood the game they were about to
participate in (see Appendix B). The experiment was started only once all participants had cor-
rectly answered all test questions. At the end of the experiment participants were asked to fill out
a questionnaire where they were asked to give reasons for their decisions (see Appendix C). We
run two treatment conditions: assignment and choice. In the assignment condition participants
were told the game they were going to participate in, while in the choice condition participants
were informed about the two games they could subsequently chose from. In the assignment con-
dition we conducted three different treatments; one implementing the prisoner’s dilemma of ta-
ble 1 (PD), and the other two implementing the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma games of tables
3 and 4 (DPDI and DPDII). In the choice condition, two different treatments were conducted. In
the first treatment participants could choose between the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and the first
version of the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma game (DPDI). In the second treatment partici-
pants could choose between the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and the second version of the decom-
posed prisoner’s dilemma game (DPDII).
All treatments where participants were assigned to play a specific game are coded by I, that is Ia
for the PD game in normal form, Ib for the first decomposition of the prisoner’s dilemma (DPDI)
and Ic for the second decomposition of the prisoner’s dilemma (DPDII). The treatments where
participants had the freedom to choose the game they wanted to play are coded by II, where the
following letters indicate the two choice options i.e. treatment IIab gives participants the freedom
to choose between the PD game and the DPDI game, and treatment IIac gives participants the
freedom to choose between the PD game and the DPDII game. Table 5 summarizes the experi-7
mental treatments, and gives information on the number of groups, i.e. the number of independ-
ent observations in each treatment.
Table 5: Experimental treatments and number of groups conducted in each treatment.




Iiab Choice between PD and DPD I 17*
Iiac Choice between PD and DPD II 18
* In the choice treatments players were grouped randomly after they had chosen the game they wanted to play. In
this particular case the amount of players who chose a particular game was not even, so that one player from each
group was randomly drawn to be excluded.
In all treatments participants played against the same opponent for 20 periods. In the choice
treatments participants played against a player who chose the same game. All this information
was common knowledge.
A total of 126 students, mainly law or economics students, took part in the experiment. The ex-
periment took 45 minutes on average. Taler (the experimental currency) were transformed into
Euro at the exchange rate of 1000 Taler = 2.
8 Average payoffs were 9.92.
4. Results
4.1. Freedom of Choice
In this section we analyze the central hypothesis of this paper. That is, if giving players the pos-
sibility of choosing the game they want to play from a set of games with identical game theoretic
properties, has a behavioral impact.
We compare behavior exhibited in the assigned prisoner’s dilemma game (treatment Ia) with the
behavior of those players that chose the prisoner’s dilemma game in the choice treatments
(IIab:PD and IIac:PD). Analogously we will contrast behavior in the two versions of the assigned
decomposed prisoner’s dilemma games (treatments Ib and Ic) against the behavior of those play-
ers that chose the corresponding decomposed prisoner’s dilemma game in the choice treatments
(IIab:DPDI and IIac:DPDII).
Table 6 gives information on the games chosen by players in the choice treatments. Participants
generally preferred the prisoner’s dilemma as opposed to the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma.
From an evaluation of the questionnaire given to participants at the end of the experiment this
appears to be due to the fact that decomposed games are cognitively more challenging than nor-
m a lf o r mg a m e s .
8 At the time the experiments were run 1 roughly corresponded with $1.8
Table 6: Number of groups choosing the PD and the DPD in the choice treatments.
Treatment Groups choosing the PD Groups choosing the DPD
IIab 14 3 (DPDI)
IIac 13 5 (DPDII)
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 plot the time series of the average cooperation rates in treatments Ia and
IIab:PD, Ia and IIac:PD, Ib and IIab:DPDI, and finally Ic and IIac:DPDII. Table 7 reports the
average cooperation rates.9




















































































































































Figures 1, 2, and 4, and table 7 clearly show the strong behavioral effect on the relative levels of
cooperation when players are given the possibility of choosing the game they want to play, as
opposed to when the game is externally imposed on them.
Table 7: Average cooperation rates by treatment
Ia Ib Ic IIab:PD IIab:DPDI IIac:PD IIac:DPDII
Average Cooperation Rates .33 .80 .66 .83 .82 .88 .91
In the cases where the prisoner’s dilemma game was chosen (treatments IIab:PD and IIac:PD),
the increase in cooperation rates compared with the assigned prisoner’s dilemma (treatment Ia) is
dramatic. In both cases there is an increase of about 60% in the rate of cooperation. The permuta-
tion test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) yields significance levels at .1% and .5% respectively.
When analyzing the differences in behavior between the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma in the
assigned condition (treatments Ib and Ic) and the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma in the choice
condition (treatments IIab:DPDI and IIac:DPDII), the effect is not as strong. Clearly, behavior in
the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma games in the assignment conditions (treatments Ib and Ic) is
highly cooperative, which makes it difficult to reach even higher cooperation levels in the choice
treatments. Furthermore, the statistical tests suffer from the relatively small number of decom-
posed prisoner’s dilemma games chosen by players (see table 6). Nevertheless, cooperation rates
in the DPDII groups where participants freely choose the game (treatment IIac:DPDII) are close
to 30% higher than in the assigned decomposed prisoner’s dilemma (treatment Ic). This is a re-
markable increase in the cooperation rate, (the permutation test yields a .1258 significance level,
one sided). In the case of the first version of the decomposed prisoner’s dilemma (treatment Ib
vs. treatment IIab:DPDI) the increase is just 2.2%, clearly not significant.
From a policy perspective, the efficiency that a particular treatment variable generates in a social
dilemma is of particular interest. Based on high cooperation rates in the choice treatments, effi-
ciency
9 is astonishingly high as well. In particular, for the normal form PD game, choice in-
creases efficiency by 100%.
10









9 Efficiency is defined as (￿ -m i n￿)/( m a x￿ -m i n￿), where min p and max p stand for the minimal and
maximal payoffs respectively.
10 Related findings have been obtained by Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992), in other social dilemma types.
In their experimental study of different sanctioning and communication mechanisms in a common-pool re-
source game, they find a higher efficiency in the treatment with endogenous sanctioning.12
4.2. Framing
In this section we discuss the effect of different frames on behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. Framing effects in social dilemma games have recently received substantial attention in
the economic literature.
11 Since Selten (1978) and Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), it is gener-
ally recognized that different presentations of game theoretically identical situations may trigger
different behavior. The following section compares our findings with previous psychological
studies.
The dominating conjecture in the psychological literature is that participants in a “give-some”
(DPDI) decomposition will see the game as one in which players have less influence upon their
respective payoffs and are less independent than in a “take-some” (DPDII) decomposition. This
perception of the game highlights the exchange potential of the situation in DPDI and enhances
cooperation. In the “take-some” framing of the game, payoffs appear to be predominantly deter-
mined by own choices suggesting independence and therefore no desire for cooperation is in-
duced.
12 Komorita (1987, p.55), summarizing the literature, remarks: The “give-some” decom-
position “evokes a high level of cooperation because it provides an opportunity to help the other
at some cost to self and thus elicits trust and the motive of mutual assistance.”
Figure 5 shows the time series of the average cooperation rates in the three assigned games (PD,
DPDI, and DPDII) with 9 independent observations each. Cooperation rates in the PD are in line
with previous studies. Average cooperation rates start relatively high, at a level between 60 and
70%, and then gradually decline through time. As expected, cooperation rates in DPDI are sub-
stantially higher than in the PD, and hence our results clearly replicate the original findings by
Evans and Crumbaugh (1966a, 1966b), Crumbaugh and Evans (1967) and Pruitt (1967).
13.A n -
other remarkable aspect of these frames is that in all three treatments cooperation starts at a simi-
lar level in the first period.
11 See for example Cookson (2000), Druckman (2001) and Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1998).
12 Komorita and Barth (1985) also provide evidence to support the hypothesis that rewards for cooperative choices
are more effective in inducing cooperation than punishment for competitive choices.
13 See also Pruitt (1970), Guyer, Fox and Hamburger (1973), Tognoli (1975), Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), Pruitt
(1981) and Komorita (1987).13





































Our findings in DPDII, however, only partially replicate previous studies. Treatment Ic is a
“take-some” decomposition and, according to the psychological literature, should induce less
cooperation than the normal form game (Treatment Ia). Following Komorita (1987, p.55) a simi-
lar but not identical decomposition evoked low levels “of cooperation because the D choice,
once it is chosen by one or both players, punishes the other and thus heightens the competitive
motivation of the players“. Since the decomposition used in Ic is not completely identical to the
decompositions previously analyzed in the literature, evidence in favor of the take-some hy-
pothesis appears to be inconclusive even though the differences between Ib and Ic, that is the
differences between give- and take-some decompositions are in the same direction as previously
found.
We consider our results as further evidence that even small changes in the framing may have a
substantial impact on behavior and cooperation rates. As Pruitt (1967, p.26) points out: “.. al-
though the DPD reduces algebraically to the standard PD, it does not necessarily reduce behav-
iorally to that game. Clearly, psychologists should not follow the lead of mathematicians and
lump together all situations that reduce algebraically to a single PD.”
In summary Figure 5 clearly shows that framing or presentation effects significantly impact be-
havior. Based on the standard results replicated in treatment Ia, both decompositions of the pris-
oner’s dilemma have a significant positive impact on cooperation rates (with significance levels
of .5% each). In the decomposed game treatment Ib participants achieve cooperation rates that
result in roughly 80% of possible profits being extracted – a 100% increase compared to the
normal form treatment.14
5. Conclusion
Self-governance has been proposed, and empirically found to be capable of mitigating or even
solving the problems associated with social dilemma situations. The foundation for such argu-
ments lies in the role of information. Those who are directly involved in the strategic situation
may have more accurate information on the cultural background, the natural environment and the
specificities of the problem, and hence may be better equipped to solve the social dilemma.
From a game theoretic perspective self-governance means to have the possibility of choosing the
game one wants to play. In this paper we hypothesize, and experimentally show, that when play-
ers are given the possibility of choosing the game from a set of given games, such a choice has a
significant impact on behavior. In our experiments participants playing a strategically equivalent
version of the PD game cooperate significantly more, even 60% more on average, when they are
given the possibility of choosing the game they will play out of two different representations of
the same game, than when they are assigned to play a specific game.
The set of games from which participants could choose contained two different representations
of a strategically identical game. Our data shows that despite this narrow difference the change
in individual and aggregate behavior may be dramatic. It can be hypothesized that if the set of
games to be chosen from not only consist of games differing with respect to frames, but also
with respect to their strategic character, resulting differences in behavior may even be more sub-
stantial.
Drawing conclusions and extrapolating from laboratory findings is always difficult and needs to
be done with the required caution. Nevertheless, we claim that the results of this paper may have
important consequences for research on social dilemma problems and policy. The results pre-
sented here have a bearing on two levels.
First, and most importantly, we believe that findings in social dilemma experiments may system-
atically underestimate cooperation levels in the field due to the fact that they neglect the appar-
ently important behavioral aspect of choice endogenous to a wide class of voluntary and self-
governing social dilemma situations. Our results show that besides the informational aspects,
motivational aspects inherent in the design and choice of institutions may be an important factor
in the successful management of social dilemmas. An immediate consequence of the later is that
decentralized processes actively involving the concerned actors may be preferable to externally
imposed solutions.
Second, we provide further evidence that suggests that the way social dilemmas are perceived by
the concerned actors is of high importance. Framing a social dilemma in a way that emphasizes
interdependence and the mutual need for cooperation clearly has an effect on cooperation rates.
The framing effect we find is particularly strong and suggests that decomposition of a strategic
situation is particularly powerful in affecting players perception of a situation and subsequent
behavior.15
Appendix A: The Written Instructions
[[In All Treatments]]
Note:
·  You have 5 minutes to read the instructions. If after reading the instructions you have any ques-
tions, please contact one of the experimenters. Communication with other participants is not al-
lowed during the experiment.
·  After the 5 minutes you will be asked to fill out a test questionnaire about the experiment you will
be part in. Once all participants have correctly answered all questions, the experiment will start.
·  After completion of the experiment you will be asked to fill out a computerized questionnaire
·  Please do not leave your seat before you have filled out the questionnaire and your terminal
number has been announced
[[In Treatments Ia, Ib and Ic]]
In the following experiment:
·  You play with another person. The decision situation, as well as the other person are identical in
each period.
·  You have to choose between A and B in each one of the 20 periods.
·  In each period, you will not know the choice of the other person before you have made your own
choice.
·  The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other persons decision.
·  After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the last decision of the
other person, the number of Talers you earned in the last period, and the total number of Talers
you have earned so far.
[[In Treatments Ia, IIab and IIac]]
The experiment:
The experiment consists of a decision situation in which you and another person will choose be-
tween A and B for 20 periods. The decision situation, as well as the person you interact with is iden-
tical in each period.16
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other person´s decision:
·  If you choose A and the other person as well, you both get 300.
·  If you choose B and the other person as well, you both get 100.
·  If you choose A and the other person chooses B, you will get 0 and the other person will get 400.
·  If you choose B and the other person chooses A you will get 400 and the other person will get 0.
After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the last decision of the other
person, the number of Talers you earned in the last period, and the total number of Talers you have
earned so far.
[[In Treatments Ib and IIab]]
The experiment:
The experiment consists of a decision situation in which you and another person will choose be-
tween A and B for 20 periods. The decision situation, as well as the person you interact with is iden-
tical in each period.
Every period you will have the opportunity to decide how many Talers you give to yourself and how
many Talers you give to the other person by choosing between A and B. The other person faces ex-
actly the same decision situation. The Talers you earn in one period is determined by the amount of
Talers you give to yourself plus the amount of Talers the other person gives to you:
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other person´s decision:
·  if you choose A you give 0 to yourself and 300 to the other person.
·  if you choose B you give 100 to yourself and 0 to the other person.
·  if the other person chooses A, he/she gives you 300 and 0 to him/herself.
·  if the other person chooses B, he/she gives you 0 and 100 to him/herself.
After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the last decision of the other
person, the number of Talers you earned in the last period, and the total number of Talers you have
earned so far.17
[[In Treatments Ic and IIac]]
The experiment:
The experiment consists of a decision situation in which you and another person will choose between
A and B for 20 periods. The decision situation, as well as the person you interact with is identical in
each period.
Every period you will have the opportunity to decide how many Talers you give to yourself and how
many Talers you give to the other person by choosing between A and B. The other person faces ex-
actly the same decision situation. The Talers you earn in one period is determined by the amount of
Talers you give to yourself plus the amount of Talers the other person gives to you:
The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other person´s decision:
·  if you choose A you give 150 to yourself and 150 to the other person.
·  if you choose B you give 250 to yourself and -150 to the other person.
·  if the other person chooses A, he/she gives you 150 and 150 to him/herself.
·  if the other person chooses B, he/she gives you -150 and 250 to him/herself.
After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the last decision of the other
person, the number of Talers you earned in the last period, and the total number of Talers you have
earned so far.
[[In Treatments IIab and IIac]]
The experiment:
The experiment is composed of two phases
Phase I:
In phase I you have the choice between two experimental situations.18
Both experimental situations have the following in common:
·  You play with another person. The decision situation, as well as the other person are identical in
each period.
·  You have to choose between A and B in each one of the 20 periods.
·  In each period, you will not know the choice of the other person before you have made your own
choice.
·  The amount of Talers you earn in each period depends on your and the other persons decision.
·  After each period you will be given information on: your last decision, the last decision of the
other person, the number of Talers you earned in the last period, and the total number of Talers
you have earned so far.
Particular to Decision Situation I:
See Ib or Ic




You will be privately paid on the basis of the total Talers accumulated in all the experiment. 1000 Taler
equal 2 Euro.
Thank you very much for your participation!19
Appendix B: The Multiple Choice Test Questions
Test Questions
[[In Treatment Ia]]
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 A? {0,100,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 as well? {0,100,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 as well? {0,100,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 B? {0,100,300,400}
[[In Treatment Ib]]
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 A? {0,100,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 as well? {0,100,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 as well? {0,100,200,300}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 B? {0,100,200,300}
[[In Treatment Ic]]
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 A? {0,150,250,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 as well? {-150,250,300,400}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 as well? {-150,100,250,300}
·  How high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 B? {0,150,250,300}
[[In Treatments IIab]]
·  In experimental situation I, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 A?
{0,100,300,400}
·  In experimental situation II, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 as well?
{0,100,300,400}
·  In experimental situation I, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 as well?
{0,10,200,300}
·  In experimental situation II, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 B?
{0,100,300,400}
[[In Treatments IIac]]
·  In experimental situation I, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 A?
{0,150,250,400}
·  In experimental situation II, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 as well?
{0,100,300,400}
·  In experimental situation I, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses B and person 2 as well?
{-150,100,250,300}
·  In experimental situation II, how high is the profit for person 1, if she chooses A and person 2 B?
{0,100,300,400}20
Appendix C: The Computerized Questionaire
Questionaire
[[In All Treatments]]






Question 7: Did you ever take a microeconomics course?
Question 8: Do you know what game theory is?
[[In Treatment Ia]]
Question 9: Do you know what a prisoner’s dilemma is?
Question 10: Additional comments?
[In treatment Ib and Ic]]
Question 9: Do you know what a decomposed prisoner’s dilemma is?
Question 10: Additional comments?
[[In Treatment IIab and IIac]]
Question 9: What experimental situation did you pick at the beginning of the experiment?
Question 10: According to what criteria did you choose between experimental situation I and II?
Question 11: Do you know what a prisoner’s dilemma is?
Question 12: Do you know what a decomposed prisoner’s dilemma is?
Question 13: Are the possible profits in both experimental situations the same?
Question 14: Additional comments?21
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